Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 6
Issue 1 1998-1999

Article 5

1998

Case Summaries

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Case Summaries, 6 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. (xxxvii) (1998)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol6/iss1/5

This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and
Sustainability Law by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Case Summaries
cinty

CASE SUMMARIES

CERCLA
U.S. v. Bestfoods et al., 118 S.
Ct. 1876 (1998)
The United States
brought suit against former owners and operators of a chemical
facility to recover the costs of
cleanup of the site. Under the
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA'),
an operator of a polluting facility
may be held responsible for these
costs. The statute does not clearly
define the word "operator" The issue in this case was whether a parent corporation could be liable, as
an operator, for cleanup costs for
pollution caused by a subsidiary's
facility under CERCLA's definition.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
The Court stated that one
way for a parent corporation to
be liable for its subsidiary's facility's
pollution was ifthe corporate veil
could be pierced. The Court recognized the long-standing principle
that parent and subsidiary corporations are separate legal entities,
but also recognized the vulnerability of the veil under certain circumstances, such as when the corporate form is used for wrongful purposes. The Court noted that application of CERCLA does not interfere with the corporate veil and
does not interfere with the excep-

tions to piercing it.
The Court then examined
the liability of parent corporations themselves as operators of
their subsidiary facilities. Under
CERCLA, "operator" is defined
circularly Noting the statute's lack
of clarity, the Court stated that an
operator "must manage, direct, or
conduct operations specifically related to pollution." This includes
making decisions about environmental regulation compliance, as
well as decisions concerning leaking waste or disposal of hazardous
waste.
In analyzing the case, the
Court stated that the focus should
not be on the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary, but between the parent and
the facility in question. The
Court mentioned that if parental
control over the subsidiary were
extensive, this control likely created a veil-piercing issue. The
Court noted that it was appropriate for parent corporation officers to be joint officers of a separate subsidiary and criticized the
District Court was criticized for
attributing the actions of joint
officers to the parent corporation.
The Court found that operator
liability cannot be established
solely on the grounds that dual officers made policy decisions and
directed activities at a subsidiary fa-

The Court cautioned that
a dual officer could deviate so far
from the normal behavior of a
joint officer as to exert parental
control over the facility. A parent corporation officer, with no
position in the subsidiary, may
also exert enough control over a
facility to make the parent corporation liable under CERCLA.
According to the Court, the key
inquiry is whether the parent corporation exceeded accepted
norms of "parental oversight of a
subsidiary's facility," to be determined by examining the degree and
detail of the parent corporation's
activities involving the subsidiary's
facility.
In remanding this case
for further findings, the Court
noted that the parent corporation
had an officer at the subsidiary
(not as a joint or dual officer).
The Court noted that the District
Court stated that this officer was
involved in environmental matters at the subsidiary facility, and
that the officer directed the regulatory inquiry responses of the
subsidiary. The Court noted that
these facts were enough to raise
the issue of parent corporation
control ofthe facility, but refused
to reach a conclusion based on
these facts. The case was remanded for introduction of more
facts could be obtained about the
parent corporation's activities at
the subsidiary facility.
Fredrick J. Ludwig

fees.

LRMPINFMA
Ohio Forestry Association,
Inc. v. Sierra Club 118 S. Ct.
1665 (1998)
The Sierra Club brought
suit in Federal District Court
against the United States Forest
Service, pursuant to the National
Forest Management Act of 1976
("NFMA"), challenging the Land
and Resource Management Plan
("LRMP") for Ohio's Wayne
National.Forest. The Ohio Forestry Association, whose membership includes those who harvest timber from the Wayne National Forest, intervened as a defendant.
The Sierra Club brought
this action challenging the LRMP
on the grounds that it was based
on erroneous analysis and:led to
wrongly favoring logging and
clearcutting in Wayne National
Forest, in violation of the NFMA,
the National Environmental
Policy Act the Administrative
Procedure Act. The Sierra Club
also claimed that the Forest Service violated its role as "public
trustee" by permitting implementation of the plan, and that defendants failed to identify economically unsuitable lands, in
violation oftheir authorizing statute. The Sierra Club sought relief in the form of a declaration
that the plan, including belowcost timber
sales, and
clearcutting, was unlawful; an
injunction prohibiting further
timber harvesting and below-cost
timber sales, pending plan revision; and costs and attorneys

The Forest Service argued that the suit was non-justiciable because the Sierra Club
did not have standing to sue, and
that the Sierra Club's claims
were not ripe for adjudication.
Supporting its defense, the Forest Service asserted that the
LRMP did not authorize the cutting of any trees, although it did
setting logging goals, select areas of the forest suited to time
production and determine probable methods of harvest. Before
permitting logging, the Forest
Service must meet several requirements, including providing
those affected by proposed logging notice and an opportunity to
be heard. The statute further requires the Forest Service to revise the plan, as appropriate. For
these reasons, the Forest Service
argued that LRMPs are not final
agency action and therefore are
not ripe for review.
The district court granted
summary judgment to the Forest
Service, holding that the Forest
Service acted lawfully in making
the various determinations challenged by the Sierra Club. On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that the
Sierra Club had standing to bring
suit, the suit was ripe for review,
and the Sierra Club should be
permitted to go forward with its
claim. The impact of the Sixth
Circuit's holding of justiciability
was that the Sierra Club need not
wait for a site-specific action to
occur before challenging the
plan. The Sixth Circuit also held
that the LRMP violated the

NFMA by improperly favoring
clearcutting.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit, on appeal, holding that,
while the Sierra Club did have
standing, its suit was not ripe for
review. The ripeness requirement
protects agencies from interference in carrying out their duties
until their decisions have become
final and the challenging party
can point to a concrete injury
they suffered as a result of the
agency's policy. Using the standards of (1) whether delayed review would cause hardship to the
plaintiffs; (2) whether judicial
intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action; and (3)
whether the courts would benefit
from further factual development
of the issue presented, the Court
held that the Sierra Club would
not suffer significant hardship
because "the Plan does not give
anyone a legal right to cut trees
nor does it abolish anyone's legal authority to object to trees
being cut." Secondly, the Court
held that judicial review would
hinder the Forest Service's ability to refine its policies through
revision of the LRMP. Thirdly,
the Supreme Court held that
Congress did not intend for
LRMPs to be subject to judicial
review before implementation.
Such review would preempt the
Congressionally mandated system by which the Forest Service
is makes logging decisions. Finally, the Court noted that challenges to LRMPs would require
time-consuming judicial consid-

I

eration, wuch might turn out to
be unnecessary, should the
agency amend its plan.
The Sierra Club's argument that it had suffered immediate harm producing a claim
ripe for review was rejected on
procedural grounds of lateness.
The Sierra Club argued that the
immediate harm resulted from
the LRMPs allowance of intrusive activities, such as the use of
heavy machinery and the nonexistence of "affirmative measures
to promote backcountry recreation" in areas the plan designated for logging in Wayne National Forest. Because this argument did not appear in the Sierra
Club's complaint, the Court refused to hear it on appeal. However, the court acknowledged
that, had the complaint raised this
claim, the substantial harm required to meet the ripeness doctrine would have existed.
The Supreme Court's
holding in this case decided a
split between the circuits by
holding that LRMPs are precluded from judicial review until site-specific action, causing
actual and substantial harm, has
occurred. It is unclear from this
case, however, whether all future
LRMPs will be found non-justiciable on the grounds of ripeness
or whether substantial harm will
be found when pleadings include
facts similar to the Sierra Club's
late claim of immediate harm.
Becky Cull

RCRA
Harmon Industries, Inc. v.
Browner, No.-97-0832-CV-W3,1998 WL 574421 (WD. Mo.
Aug.25, 1998)
Harmon Industries, Inc.
("Appellant") filed an appeal in
the United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri challenging the Environmental Protection Agency's
("EPA") final order, affirming
Appellant's federal penalty liability under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). Prior to the institution of enforcement proceedings
leading to the EPA's final order,
Appellant discovered in November of 1987 that employees at its
Grain Valley, Missouri, assembly
facility unlawfully disposed of
large quantities of hazardous organic solvent wastes between
1973 and 1987. Upon this discovery, Appellant's management
ordered its employees to cease
this disposal practice, changed its
assembly process, thereby excluding the use of hazardous
cleaning materials, and ordered
Phase I, II, and III environmental audits of the facility's
grounds.
The Phase I report not
only noted the presence of hazardous wastes in the soil, but also
that no danger to human health
or the environment existed.
Based upon this and the fact that
such disposal practice ceased, the
Phase II report concluded "a viable option would be to leave the
organic compounds in the ground
with a very small risk of future
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environmental problems." Finally, the Phase III report stated
that Appellant's discontinued
solvent disposal practice "did not
pose a threat to human health or
environment." Thereafter, Appellant voluntarily notified and
collaborated with the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR") regarding the
cleanup at the facility.
In conjunction with the
cleanup MDNR dated May 29,
1990, and October 15, 1990, the
EPA Region VII stated that
MDNR should assess civil monetary penalties against Appellant.
The EPA also threatened to institute a separate action against
Appellant if the MDNR failed to
initiate a formal enforcement
action involving penalties against
Appellant within 30 days. On
September 30, 1991, EPA Region
VII filed a four-count administrative complaint against Appellant seeking over two million
dollars in civil penalties. During that same month, the Missouri Attorney General's office
issued to Appellant a first draft
of a consent decree, which conditionally waived civil penalties
and a subsequent enforcement
action provided that Appellant
investigated and remedied the
contamination at the site and submitted semi-annual documentation, demonstrating Appellant's
attempt to obtain liability insurance in order to comply with
RCRA's financial assurance and
liability requirements. In addition, the decree included terms
to the effect that "compliance
with [the] [c]onsent [d]ecree con-

stitutes full satisfaction and release from all claims arising from
allegations contained in [the
State of Missouri's] petition."
After some revision, Appellant
and the MDNR signed the decree
on November 19, 1992, and
January 4, 1993, respectively. On
March 5, 1993, the State of Missouri filed the consent decree
along with a petition against Appellant in the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri; that
day, the court entered and approved the decree.
Following the state
court's approval of the consent
decree, the EPA's Administrative
Law Judge ("AL") held an administrative. evidentiary hearing,
regarding the penalty issue, decided against Appellant on all
counts, and rendered a decision
imposing civil penalties against
Appellant for all counts, totaling
$586,716. In imposing penalties
against Appellant, the ALJ characterized Appellant's conduct as
creating either major or moderate potential of harm pursuant to
the EPA's RCRA Civil Penalty
Policy and Civil Enforcement
Policy. Appellant Harmon Industries appealed the ALJ's decision
to the EPXs three-judge Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB"),
which affirmed the penalty decision on March 24, 1997. Appellant then filed this action against
the Director of the EPA on June
6, 1997.
Appellant challenged the
EPA's interpretation that §
6926(b) and (d) do not preclude
the EPA from seeking a civil penalty as authorized by § 6928.

"The EPA contends that the
states can have hazardous waste
programs but the EPA can always
override, or overfile, the state's
enforcement action." Appellant
relied on the plain language of §
6926, specifically the "same
force and effect" and "in lieu of'
provisions, and the language of
the consent decree. In contesting the EPA's statutory authority
to overfile and seek a civil monetary penalty when a state with
an EPA-authorized hazardous
waste program has resolved the
issue without a penalty, Appellant further asserted that res judicata principles estopped the
EPA's subsequent imposition of
liability on Plaintiff. Finally,
Appellant contended that the
EPA's civil penalty is time-barred
under the federal statute of limitations and that the penalty is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and not supported by
substantial evidence.
The district court began
its opinion by setting forth the
standard of review employed by
courts when examining final administrative decisions pursuant
to the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). The court stated
that it must defer to the EPA's
construction of §§ 6926 and 6928
if such construction is consistent
with the unambiguous letter of
the law or represents a reasonable interpretation in the face of
ambiguity.
.The court found the plain
language the statute determinative in finding "that the M1DNR
operates 'in lieu of' or instead of
the federal program." In addi-

tion, the court found that the
EPA's delegation of authority, the
Memorandum of Agreement between the two agencies and the
legislative history support the
notion that the EPA and MDNR
have concurrent authority over
RCRA rather than co-existing
equal enforcement powers. The
court resolved that the EPA only
has the option of withdrawing its
authorization of an inactive state
program under § 6926(e); not the
power to reject and override part
of an authorized state's settlement in a particular case when
the EPA finds the penalty inadequate. Furthermore, the court
found that §§ 6928(2) and
6926(e) are not inconsistent and
must be read together, otherwise
authorized state actions would
not have the "same force and effect" as federal actions pursuant
to RCRA § 6926(d). Finally, the
court concluded that the EPA did
not have the statutory authority
to overfile because "the EPA's interpretation of RCRA [contradicts] the purposes behind authorizing state hazardous waste programs."
In determining the res
judicata effect of the consent decree, the court applied the
Hickman rule. Under Missouri
law, Hickman embodies the rule
that "estoppel by a former judgment, or res judicata, requires:
(1) identity of the thing sued for,
(2) identity ofthe cause of action,
(3) identity of the persons and
parties to the action, and (4) identity of the quality of the person
for or against whom the claim is
made." Applying this rule, the
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court determined that the only and Scenic Rivers Act
issue was whether the EPA was ("WSRA"). Traffic congestion
in privity to the state court action and safety issues spurred MDOT
and consent decree, to which it and WDOT to work together to
was not a party. The court con- replace one of the bridges on the
cluded that resjudicata under the river and to modify the apfederal statute barred the EPA proaches to it.
To get the project under
from imposing penalties on Apway,
agencies
issued an Environpellant because, under Hickman,
MDNR and the EPA were in priv- mental Impact Statement, which
ity where the MDNR's actions is required by the National Enviwere taken for the interests of the ronmental Policy Act, and a Section 4(f) Statement required by
EPA under RCRA.
Although the Missouri the Federal Transportation Act.
district court agreed with the Although the statements recomEPA's arguments that the statute mended the construction, the
of limitations had not run due to proposed project would have sigthe continuous violations excep- nificant impact on the bed and
tion and that substantial evidence banks of the river and require
supported the EPAs penalty as- extensive dredge and fill activsessment, the district court re- ity. The Federal Highway Adversed the EAB's decision with ministration ("FHA") approved
respect to the EPA's authority to the plans in November 1995, and
pursue overfiling. The court the construction contracting was
found that the EPA lacked the au- set to begin.
However, in June 1996,
thority to overfile because the
the
Sierra
Club North Star Chapplain language and reasonable
interpretation of the statute did ter and Voyageurs Region Nanot lend support for the existence tional Park Association filed suit
against the United States Departof such authority.
ment of Transportation, the FHA,
the Department of the Interior
WSRA
("DOI") and the National Park
Service ("NPS") to stop construction on the project, alleging
Sierra Club North Star
that DOI had violated Section
Chapter v. Pena, I F. Supp.2d
7(a) of the WSRA, 16 U.S.C. §
971 (D.Minn. 1998)
The Minnesota Depart- 1278(a) (1994), by not determinment
of
Transportation ing whether the Project would
("MDOT") and the Wisconsin have a direct and adverse effect
Department of Transportation upon the values for which the
("WDOT") wanted to build a Lower St. Croix was included in
four-lane bridge across the the WSRA. In September 1996,
Lower St. Croix River, a part of the NPS instructed the United
the National Wild and Scenic States Coast Guard and the Corps
Rivers System under the Wild of Engineers to put MDOT's per-

nut requests on hold. Shortly
thereafter, the FHA rescinded its
authorization of the construction
pending the outcome of the Section 7 determination. MDOT
and WDOT asserted crossclaims against the Interior Secretary and NPS Director disputing the determination that the
bridge was a "water resources
project" within the WSRA and,
therefore, required a Section 7
evaluation.
In December 1996, NPS
issued a Section 7 determination,
finding that the proposed bridge
constituted a "water resources
project" and that the project
would directly and negatively
affect the conditions that allowed
the river to be included under the
WSRA. Pursuant to this report,

NPS blocked issuance of necessary construction permits or authorizations by the applicable
federal agencies.
MDOT moved for an order vacating the NPS determinations. MDOT claimed the NPS
decision was arbitrary, capricious, and in excess of statutory

authority. The Sierra Club North
Star Chapter and Voyageurs Region National Park Association,
the United States, and the City
of Oak Park Heights filed memoranda opposing the motion.
The United States District Court for Minnesota held
that when a river is classified as
part of the Wild and Scenic River
System, a bridge construction
project over the river would
qualify as a "water resources

project" under the WSRA. The
court recognized the act's stated

purpose was to preserve the included rivers' "free-flowing condition ... for the benefit and en-

joyment of present and future
generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1271
(1994). The court began by observing that "water resources
project" is not defined anywhere
in the WSRA, and no case law
exists on the question. In addition, the court found that no legislative history specifically addressed the issue.
The court then turned to
whether the WSRA permitted the
Secretary of the Interior's
("Secretary's") treatment of the
bridge as a "water resource
project." Because the Department of the Interior was respohsible for defining the phrase, the
court accepted as reasonable the
Secretary's interpretation of"water resources project," which included "any type of construction
which would result in any change
in the free-flowing characteristics of a [wild and scenic] river."
MDOT made several arguments that revolved around
what it deemed insufficient notice. MDOT claimed Section 7
had been applied inconsistently
to bridge projects. However, the
court found no evidence of variance in the statute's application.
In addition, MDOT argued that
the Secretary inconsistently applied Section 7 to the particular
project at issue in this case, an
argument the court refuted. In
its final notice argument, MDOT
said it should not be penalized
because of the Secretary's failure to publish the interpretation
of "water resources project" in

the Federal Register as required ter resources project."
Lisa R. Robinelt
by the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"). The court did not
find this argument persuasive,
because the evidence showed
that the responsible agencies repeatedly gave MDOT notice that
its proposed bridge project would
be subject to the WSRA.
In addition, MDOT challenged the Section 7 determination itself First, MDOT argued
that the NPS erred because Congress did not include the Lower
St. Croix in the statutory river
system for its scenic qualities
and, therefore, the NPS should
not consider the scenic impact of
the bridge. The court rejected
this argument because MDOT
confused the values for which a
river is established under the
WSRA, which rest on the river's
inherent attributes, with the
river's classification under the
act, which is based on the amount
of development in the river area.
MDOT's second basis for
challenging the NPS Section 7
decision was that the determination that the construction would
have direct, adverse effects on
the area was arbitrary and capricious. However, the court found
that the NPS made detailed findings on all issues.
MDOT also argued that
the necessity of a project should
be a controlling factor in an
evaluation. The court rejected
this proposition, stating that there
is no evidence in the WSRA or
its guidelines that discuss taking
need into consideration. Subsequently, the court upheld the
broad NPS interpretation of "wa

